On the evening of Tuesday 30 November 1830, incendiaries set fire to a wheat-stack and a hay-stack situated in two fields a quarter of a mile outside Carlisle, Cumberland. Large crowds gathered at the sites of both fires and proceeded to riot. Disturbances continued the following day when workmen attempted to salvage what little remained of the stacks. Local newspapers and witnesses at the ensuing trial assumed that the incidents were the work of 'Captain Swing', the imaginary leader of the wave of arson and agricultural machine-breaking that was concurrently raging across southern England. This impression of the unusual nature of the agitation was amplified when, some days later, the clerk of the peace and several local gentlemen received threatening letters signed with pseudonyms including 'Swing'. Two handloom weavers, James Mendham, alias Montgomery, aged twenty-six, and Robert Thursby, aged thirty-eight, were eventually arrested and tried for arson, and five other men were charged with rioting.
1
This outbreak of 'Swing' in Carlisle was highly significant, not least because the Swing riots are usually associated with the arable flatlands of southern England rather than the rugged hills and industrial ports of Cumberland. Eric Hobsbawm and George Rude´noted only briefly in their classic study, Captain Swing, that Cumberland and the other northern counties were 'affected by rick-burning'. 2 Hobsbawm and Rude´'s work inspired numerous studies of rural disturbances in Kent, Sussex, and other 'Swing' counties in southern England, but few north of Derbyshire. 'Swing Unmasked', the innovatory project involving family and community historians, found over fifty incidents (broadly defined) in northern England, but these have not been examined in detail. 3 Superficially, therefore, the Carlisle example could simply be used to shift historians' focus on Swing northwards. Northern inhabitants responded forcefully to political and social unrest in 1830 by creating their own Captain Swing. The Carlisle riots were followed a few days later by another stack fire at nearby Dalston; at least a dozen other major fires or disturbances occurred in Yorkshire between 1830 and 1834. 4 However, it cannot be denied that the History Workshop Journal 6 This essay builds on that new approach to Swing. Although the agitation in northern England was influenced by the idea of 'Captain Swing' emanating from the south, its causes and contexts were distinctive. The first part of the essay argues that the Swing riots in Carlisle were a culmination of the long history of social and political conflict in the city. In particular, it calls upon historians to pay closer attention to the impact of 'the reactive and proactive behaviour' of magistrates, police, and the newspapers upon how Swing was perceived and spread. The Carlisle case also points to the permeable periphery between rural and urban areas: Swing was not a wholly agricultural phenomenon. 13 These structural factors rationalize the disturbances and place them into a definable socio-economic context. Yet we still have to deal with 'Captain Swing', whose slippery and intangible presence distinguished the agitation of the early 1830s from the other waves of incendiarism that beset rural society throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The second part of this essay unpicks the myth of Swing. Most of the evidence for the character's existence comes from the anonymous threatening letters and the shadowy figures reported in newspapers and in magistrates' correspondence with the Home Office. Swing letters often represented a multiplicity of voices with myriad grievances, and thus are problematic for historians seeking to attribute rational motives to events that were often only indirectly connected. 14 Nevertheless, the idea of the mythical leader became a convenient framework for understanding the complexities of popular unrest in the early 1830s.
This perception of Swing draws on my rethinking of the meaning of 'General Ludd', the mythical leader of the industrial machine-breakers in 1812. 15 I argued in an earlier article that Ludd was imagined by disparate groups of workers who were militarized by the Napoleonic war but lacked a prominent political leader to unite them. Crucially, the authorities also fostered the myth. Ludd was a way to make sense of what was in many ways an intangible threat, and to cover up for the magistrates' weakness in enforcing order. By contrast, there is little evidence that arsonists or agricultural machine-breakers in 1830-4 saw Captain Swing as a figurehead. The only claims to be Swing came from the anonymous writers of threatening letters, who cannot be connected directly with the rioters and arsonists. Unlike Ludd, the pseudonym of Swing was not a point of coherence for a 'movement' of agricultural labourers, least of all in the isolated instances in the North. As Jones has identified in Kent, Swing was a product of 'those who required an enemy on which to focus their fears and disapproval rather than protesters who sought a mythical ally'. 16 In the early 1830s, northern local authorities found it convenient to tar popular agitation with the brush of Swing, even though it had little to do with incidents of arson down south. Rioters and the forces of law and order alike came to conclusions aroused by rumour and panic, emotions that consequently fed back into perceptions of the disturbances. * * * The Carlisle riots of November 1830 involved many twists and turns. Hobsbawm and Rude´gave the impression that radical politics was at the heart of the conflict. They very briefly described the rick-burning as 'an act of political reprisal' and noted that 'three weavers -described as Radicalswere arrested'. 17 As we will see, this formed only part of the story. Richard Mendham, father of the main suspect James Mendham (alias Montgomery), had been imprisoned in 1802 for belonging to an illegal trade combination and participating in political activities connected with the republican United Scotsmen. Montgomery was turned in by his family, who used the reward money to pay for his legal defence. 18 The two other weavers, Daniel McCrory, aged 22, and James Cully, aged 55, were put under an arrest warrant but escaped capture. In December, a magistrate suspected that Cully, 'one of the worst characters in Carlisle', had unsuccessfully attempted to 'summon the Radicals in this neighbourhood to go to Carlisle to attempt to rescue a prisoner who is in the gaol'.
19 It was Montgomery with one Robert Thursby, however, who faced the assizes in February 1831, and not McCrory and Cully.
The riots in Carlisle coincided with intensified pressure for parliamentary reform during the autumn of 1830, so it is not surprising that Hobsbawm and Rude´connected the incendiarism with political radicalism. The county capital and port was situated on the main routes between the textile centres of Lancashire, Northumberland, northern Ireland and southern Scotland. It was well used to the passing through of trade-union and political 'delegates', such as the fiery Scottish orator 'Jemmy Weems', who led the last wave of radical agitation in 1819. 20 Revolution in France in July 1830 reinvigorated radical energies across Britain. Carlisle was by no means on the periphery of these developments. In September 1830, working-class radicals held large meetings on Carlisle Sands to draw up petitions for universal suffrage. A group of merchants, solicitors, and other middle-class reformers formed a political union with the tentative co-operation of a delegation of handloom weavers from among the radicals. 21 On 2 November the Duke of Wellington made a defiant declaration in the House of Lords against reform, provoking furious reaction by reformers inside and outside parliament. 22 On 5 November in Carlisle a handbill appeared calling for a public meeting in the market-place. It castigated local authorities for opposing the radicals, proclaiming: 'It looks as if our Magistracy wishes to load Reformers with the Epithet of Plunders [sic] or Robbers to sink starving people in the estimation of their fellow Citizens and to shed Blood'. 23 Although the handbill did not associate itself directly with Swing, the author was clearly aware of the potency of posting such a notice on Guy Fawkes' night.
Radical agitation came to a head on 8, 9, and 10 November. London was convulsed by violent rioting, exacerbated by the inhabitants' reaction against the new metropolitan police. 24 Radicals in Carlisle demonstrated in a highly ordered, though equally threatening, manner. Each night, large processions moved out of the working-class suburb of Caldewgate, entered the city, and paraded three times around the market cross in front of the town hall. On 8 November, the procession culminated with the burning of an effigy of Wellington, who was still holding firm against reform. The next night, an effigy of Sir Robert Peel, Home Secretary and founder of the metropolitan police, was consigned to the flames. On 10 November a placard inscribed 'Death to the Constitution' was the subject of the same ritual. 25 The Police Commission responded by holding a meeting at the end of the week to swear in 150 special constables, 'principally shopkeepers', and the magistracy issued a caution against tumultuous behaviour. On 18 November, when news arrived of the resignation of Wellington's ministry, yet another torch-lit procession marched through the main streets and again circled the market cross three times before returning home. These rituals were reputedly observed by up to six thousand inhabitants, that is, around a third of the population. 26 The processions were neither unthinking nor spontaneous. They drew on a common practice of burning effigies of local and national figures now transposed by the radicals to the new political circumstances. 27 The rapidly changing social geography of Carlisle underpinned the tensions that erupted in 1830. By the early nineteenth century, economic development had profoundly altered what had once been an administrative and military border capital and port, surrounded by farms. 28 The population of the city swelled from just over four thousand in 1763 to about nineteen thousand in 1831. Carlisle 'within the walls' was bursting to the seams with urban infilling, but the most rapid growth occurred in the suburbs of Caldewgate (encompassing Shaddongate) and Botchergate, situated outside the walls and along the main roads into the city. Between 1788 and 1841, the population of Caldewgate tripled to over five and a half thousand. Handloom weaving and other textile industries were the main employment of these outlying districts. Mass immigration further served to change the character of the city. In 1832, of 7,130 males over the age of twenty in Carlisle, 1,870 had been born in Ireland and about a thousand in Scotland. The majority of these immigrants settled outside the walls. 29 Carlisle was divided by class, employment and authority. Caldewgate and Willow Holme, the two areas where the Swing attacks occurred, sustained a distinct sense of apartness from the rest of Carlisle. Although sections of the city walls were demolished earlier in the century, the high west walls remained. These walls and the river Caldew separated the new industrial suburbs from the city centre above, particularly as they were traversable only at the north end, by an old bridge named 'Irish Gate'. Unrest occurred in a liminal periphery that was neither solely rural nor completely urban. The resident Irish and Scottish communities were known as 'Shaddongaters', which suggests the strong bonds among them. 30 Dissent, religious or political, was often a feature of marginal districts of old towns. Yet herein lay the twist in the tale. Neither radicals nor ordinary 'Shaddongaters' incited the Swing rick-burning of 30 November 1830. The case against Montgomery and Thursby was dismissed by the assize court. Witness depositions taken during the rioters' trial in March 1831 revealed that the arsonists were in fact agents provocateurs hired by the authorities. The fires had been started at the instigation of one William Huntington, a petty criminal, employed along with another ex-convict, James Wallace by the Chief Constable of police, Benjamin Batty, 'to look after' the 'Radical Concern'. 32 Wallace had passed these duties on to Huntington in order to avoid detection by the populace; he explained that, 'as it was known I did a little business with him [Batty], I thought the people in Shaddowgate would not let me go amongst them so much as I used to do'. 33 Furthermore, Batty's account for paying the agents was remunerated by the mayor and town clerk rather than by his employers the Police Commissioners. 34 The governing authorities of Carlisle therefore appear to have colluded to provoke the attacks under the convenient banner of Swing. It is likely that they did so in order to find an excuse to clamp down on the radical political activity in Caldewgate. The reformist Carlisle Journal was loud in its condemnation:
A system of espionage is here developed as dangerous to the peace of the city as it is disgraceful to the police establishment. . . How many more are in Batty's service did not appear. . . but from the whole tenor of the disclosures made by Wallace and Huntingdon [sic] -coupled with the hope that they entertained of poaching the rewards of £600 as the price of innocent blood they endeavoured to shed -little doubt remains in our minds but that a most extensive system of espionage has been carried on. 35 The scandal echoed earlier controversies about spies. During the Luddite disturbances of 1812 magistrates in Lancashire had employed 'blackfaces' to stoke up unrest in order to arrest suspected political and trade-union activists; Southern Swing rioters blackened their faces both as disguise and to symbolize customary community justice. 36 The 'blackfaces' in the Carlisle case were the spies. Little had changed since the well-publicized case of 'Oliver' the spy had aroused indignation across the country in 1817. Whig reformers widely castigated the Home Office for employing 'Oliver' as agent provocateur in the 'Pentrich Rising' that had led to the execution of three men for high treason. 37 Yet the difficulties in policing expanding industrial districts continued. The authorities in Carlisle, as elsewhere, were still reliant on subterfuge in their attempts to suppress radicalism.
So the arsonists were not the agents of Swing. Although it is hard to discount radicals being involved in the riots that followed, neither can it be proved that the incendiarism was part of a concerted radical conspiracy. 38 On the contrary, it is possible that the agents provocateurs picked the stack at Willow Holme to fire because its owner, the spirit merchant John Andrew, was warm to reform. The following year Andrew granted permission for the radicals to hold a meeting on his property, even though such assemblies had been prohibited by the mayor. 39 One radical individual at least attempted to help rather than hinder the owners of the stacks. The bookseller James Arthur, soon to become prominent as a Chartist leader, made his first public appearance trying to put out Scottish farmer James McCutcheon's burning stack at Caldewgate. His ladder was 'pulled down and thrust into the flames' by the rioters. 40 Chief Constable Batty's plan backfired, however. Either out of eagerness to arrest radicals, or from naı¨ve assumptions about the loyalty of Carlisle inhabitants, the authorities seem not to have expected the exuberant reaction of the spectators. Indeed, the actions of the majority of the Caldewgate inhabitants were more significant than the fires themselves: the crowds were wildly enthusiastic, and prevented the authorities from putting out the blaze. Not only this, they took great pains to destroy the machinery of the fire engines. The Carlisle Journal reported:
The feeling exhibited by a considerable portion of the crowd was certainly that of exultation, and they not only refused to assist in extinguishing the flames, but were active in preventing others from assisting. The buckets were taken from those carrying water and tossed into the flames, amidst considerable cheering; the pipes of the fire-engines were cut in six pieces, and a police officer. . . was knocked down by a stone. 41 Benjamin Batty made a vivid deposition to the assizes about his ordeal at the Caldewgate stack: I very soon found there was a great pressure from the Crowd upon the people working the Engine so as to prevent them working and I was standing between the Pipe and the burning Stack and the pipe was pressed towards me so as to push me towards the fire. I repeatedly admonished the people to keep back until I perceived that it was evidently intentional for the purpose of preventing the engine from working and when the people saw that the engine was stopped and that I was overpowered they repeatedly cheered.
Upon finding that the pipe had been cut, Batty was met with 'a more vehement cheering from the crowd than before and a more violent pressure was made against me towards the fire'. 42 The rioters were less concerned with the owners of the stacks therefore than with the Chief Constable. Batty escaped, mustered military reinforcements, and eventually rescued the ruined engine. Although no more stacks were fired, the anger of the Caldewgate inhabitants revived the next day, and they drove off the workmen removing what was salvageable from the stacks. 43 Rumours of continuing disorder were spread by the national newspapers. The Police Commissioners felt obliged to issue a poster to counteract the 'most erroneous impression throughout the Country that the people of Carlisle and its suburbs are in a state bordering on Insurrection'. 44 The rioters therefore misconstrued the aims of the authorities, but their actions cannot easily be categorized. Of course, enthusiasm for the fire may have been fuelled by drink and the spectacle of the event. The five people arrested for rioting were men aged between fifteen and twenty, and we cannot discount adolescent high spirits among factors inciting them to violence. 45 Nevertheless, the crowd reaction paralleled general responses to arson in East Anglia in the 1830s and 1840s. John E. Archer has noted the importance there of 'the enormous solidarity, and even overt sympathy, of the majority of the working people towards the instigators of the fires'. He attributes this sympathy to the moral economy, an expression of community justice against a landowner or local notable who had transgressed unwritten social laws. Arson 'gave labouring communities the opportunity to transform an act of covert protest into a collective and overt display of hatred against farmers'. 46 Other areas experienced similar responses, though the targets might be different. Peter Jones has equated Swing attacks in Kent to community enforcement of the moral economy against increasingly tightfisted poor law authorities. 47 In Carlisle, various social and economic grievances were aired during the disturbances. The Carlisle Journal reported that the phrase 'This will teach them to make Corn laws' was heard from one part of the Swing crowd. 48 Although the veracity of this allegation cannot be verified, Whig merchants had blamed the protectionist legislation for the severe economic distress that had afflicted the port in the late 1820s. The introduction of new powerlooms had also depressed weavers' employment and provoked machinebreaking in Lancashire in 1826. During the 1826 election, Tory candidate Sir Philip Musgrave's support for agricultural protection enraged the crowd at the hustings. He was forcibly put on a loom and made to weave, while his supporters and members of the Corporation were ducked in the mill dam. Relations between local inhabitants and the governing elites soured further when three people were killed after the military fired over the heads of the crowds in Caldewgate. 49 The Swing riots were in fact the product of a running debate about policing and authority in the city. It is clear that the crowd had one primary target on 30 November 1830: the Police Commission. The formation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829 and of the forces created in the wake of the Swing riots and Chartist agitation, especially after the 1839 Rural Police Act, provoked controversy. Robert Storch has charted the severe popular resistance to the new police across the industrial districts of northern England in the 1840s. 50 Yet before 1829, local elites had already sought to solve the problem of keeping order in expanding urban areas. In 1823, manufacturers and professionals in Carlisle, led by a solicitor named Henry Pearson, set up their own police office in defiance of the Tory Corporation. The two sides jostled over an application for a new police bill. 51 Rivalry between the old elites and the merchants and manufacturers framed the prolonged conflict, a situation that troubled other industrializing towns before the Whigs increased their dominance over local government in the 1830s. 52 The debate over policing also reflected wider opposition to the Lowthers, Lords Lonsdale, the leading Tory magnates in Cumberland. Sir William Lowther was busy developing his economic interests in the port of Whitehaven, but he retained a strong hand in the Carlisle district as lord lieutenant, as patron of the Corporation, as one of the borough's MPs, and through the Patriot newspaper. 53 The anti-Corporation faction eventually succeeded in having themselves elected as Police Commissioners in 1827. They appointed eighteen constables, headed by Batty. The 1827 Carlisle Police Act was an attempt by the middle classes to defend their property and to enforce order in the expanding city, but essentially they failed. Batty was brought in to circumvent local influence, but his outsider status marked him out as a target for disgruntled local inhabitants. The funding of the Police Commission continued to be a bugbear between the Whig middle classes and the Corporation. 54 Relations were further soured in 1830, when a political union to campaign for reform was set up by Whigs, prominent among them Henry Pearson, and Peter and John Dixon, major employers of handloom weavers in Caldewgate. 55 The new police were deemed by the Tories to be as ineffective as Parish Constables because both were assumed to share the sympathies of the crowd. When a Corporation official reported to Lord Lowther on the problems of keeping order during the week after the Swing riots, he blamed the disturbed situation on the indisposition of the two elderly city magistrates, and the 'utter inefficiency of our police -fifty men of various opinions and some of them revolutionary'. 56 It is difficult to ascertain whether this was the case. The comment nevertheless reflected a sustained fear among the Tories about 'Jacobinical police' and their Whig supporters. 57 The Tory Corporation may have funded the agents of Swing to avenge themselves against the Whigs, but it is also likely perhaps that moderate reformers condoned the set-up so as to distance themselves from their former allies in the radical working classes.
Yet again the distinctive social geography of the city shaped the turn of events. It is no coincidence that the Swing rioters singled out Chief Constable Benjamin Batty for attack. Batty came from Manchester and had served as a deputy to Joseph Nadin, notorious for his involvement with 'Oliver' the spy in 1817 and for his part in the 'Peterloo Massacre' two years later, when local elites sent the yeomanry to suppress a peaceful reform meeting in Manchester. 58 Batty's first venture into Caldewgate upon his appointment in 1827 had already demonstrated the helplessness of a civilian force in the suburb and identified him as a figurehead (and scapegoat) for authority. After dividing the rest of the city into police districts, he attempted to do the same across the river but found the locals recalcitrant.
Mr Batty and the officers under him, met with serious resistance from the Irish, Scotch and other weavers in Shaddongate when making their first survey of that part of the suburbs; when the then turbulent inhabitants, unused to the interference of an effective police, became so outrageous that it was necessary to call in the aid of the military. 59 One of the suspected 'ringleaders' arrested for the attack on Batty in 1827 was none other than Daniel McCrory, who in 1830 was put under warrant for helping to fire the stacks at Caldewgate. 60 The Carlisle Patriot reported that McCrory, 'a good looking and well dressed young man', protested innocence, but 'Mr Batty recognised him in the crowd dressed in a soldier's jacket'. 61 McCrory was one rioter among many on that night in 1830, but it is possible that Batty and the informants singled him out because they knew his previous opposition to them. Another man accused of riot was a William Mendham, possibly a relation of James Montgomery or his radical father Richard Mendham. Robert Armstrong, who gave testimony for the defence during the Swing rioters' trial, was again a Shaddongate weaver and had been arrested in 1827; Huntington the informer worked in his son's workshop. 62 The riots of 1830, then, were the culmination of growing social and political tensions among a divided population. The Carlisle elites blamed the new industrial communities outside the city walls, especially their immigrant inhabitants, for fomenting the unrest. The Mayor, Thomas Lowry, reported to the Home Office that 'the principal Cotton Manufacturers' had remonstrated with their weavers about the disturbances and 'they received assurances that every endeavour should be used to repress the more violent among their body'. Another indication of tensions within and without the city was the trouble that the magistrates had in recruiting enough special constables to put down the disturbances. Lowry had to send out summonses to many who refused to be sworn in, and raised the possibility of issuing legal proceedings against the defaulters.
63 On 4 December, when the authorities had finally gathered 200 special constables, they defiantly headed out of the Town Hall to Caldewgate in order to arrest those suspected of fomenting the crowd violence and the senders of threatening letters. The reaction of the inhabitants was vehement: 'Women assembled in different parts of the streets and heckled the special constables'. 64 Batty presumably felt forced to retire back to Manchester, but a new Chief Constable took over in 1831. 65 Reform agitation continued to stoke popular resentment against policing. During the general election of April 1831, veteran radical Jemmy Weems headed a meeting on Carlisle Sands attended by over 3,000 workers. They resolved not to 'hire themselves as bludgeon-men to assist the anti-Reformers'. 66 The demonstrations from January to April 1831 followed the same patterns, routes, and rituals as before. They carried and burned an effigy of Lord Lonsdale, 'on the breast of which was painted in large letters, ''The Great Beelzebub of the North'' '. 67 Disturbances broke out again on 21 March 1832, the day appointed for a national fast to pray for an end to the cholera pandemic then sweeping across the country. The official fast was perceived with resentment as elite hypocrisy given the distressed situation of the poor. Irish and Scottish weavers repeated the ritual parade from Caldewgate over the river and into the city, this time carrying placards which asserted that food shortages caused cholera. An effigy of Spencer Perceval, the MP who had put forward the motion for the fast, was burned at the market cross. When the rioters were later being tried the prosecution claimed that: 'While they remained in the Market place their disposition towards the Police was Manifested by their attack upon a Man who had offended them in some way upon which there was a general cry ''D -m him he is a Police Officer'' '. 68 Hostility to the police, though heightened during unrest, was a constant theme. Resistance to new forms of external authority continued to shape the later campaigns against the New Poor Law of 1834 and the rural police in the 1840s. 69 The Carlisle Swing riots had specific local triggers, but their socio-economic context was mirrored in other parts of the region. On Dalston Common, five miles south-west of the city, a wheat-stack was fired on 5 December 1830: 'the reflection of the light was seen at Carlisle and excited great alarm'. 70 Little other evidence about the incident remains, and it may have merely been mimicry by a lone incendiarist. On the other hand, Dalston's patterns of immigration and industrialization resembled Carlisle's, and there too social and economic tensions may have manifested themselves through Swing and other forms of resistance. Dalston and Carlisle weavers and spinners had co-operated in unionized activity in the late 1820s; Dalston radicals burned an effigy of Wellington on 20 November 1830, two weeks before the rick-fire, and during the 1831 election over sixty trees were secretly maimed in nearby plantations owned by prominent supporters of the Lowthers. The weaving districts of both towns went on to foster Chartist associations in 1838.
* * *
We turn now to examine the threatening letters sent to local notables and accumulated by the constabulary in 1830-31. A comparable sample of Swing letters was collected by Henry Lascelles, second Earl of Harewood and Lord Lieutenant of the West Riding of Yorkshire, and these will be examined here. 72 This evidence of course must be treated with care. As E. P. Thompson lamented, we cannot be sure whether the threats represented genuine protest or merely 'the voice of a crank'. 73 Nevertheless, the letters are invaluable in explaining the myth of Swing and its spread. They reveal a complex narrative of rumour, panic, and imitation that went far beyond the immediate causes and consequences of the rick-burning. They made the disturbances -or how they were perceived -distinctly 'Swing', rather than being just more rural incendiarism. The Carlisle and the West Riding letters share common characteristics that indicate they had little to do with actual disturbances but rather developed a discourse of their own. Firstly, most of the West Riding letters -and all the Carlisle ones -were dated or received in December 1830. The Carlisle letters were therefore reactive to the agitation and its repression. Rather than forewarnings of action (as was usually the case with incendiarism), they were an opportunistic product of the heightened social and political tensions. Of course, these particular letters may only have survived because magistrates were more concerned to retain evidence after the disturbances; there may have been earlier letters that were discarded, although this was not mentioned in any trial depositions. Secondly, the early letters were signed not by 'Swing' but by more common generic pseudonyms such as 'A. Radical' (2 December) and 'A. Philanthropist' (10 December). 74 These aliases suggest that their writers were following a set pattern of what they expected anonymous letters to look like. Threatening letters had long been a feature of rural unrest and crime. As they were printed in newspaper reports and reward notices throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries their generic format was familiar. 75 Once authors realized the utility of the myth of Swing, the format of the letters mutated. The first letter in the Carlisle collection to be signed 'Swing' was dated 4 January 1831. William Hodgson, the city's Clerk of the Peace, was warned by 'Swing' in the name of the 'committee' that 'your house & other property shall be burnt to ashes from the bad character you have with the people of Carlisle'. The author may have aimed to tap into the wider reaction to authorities' suppression of the disturbances, and by now might know that invocation of Swing would amplify the threat in a way that more generic pseudonyms could not. The letter may also have been an expression of wider discontent against the Lowthers: Hodgson was Lord Lonsdale's agent in Carlisle. 76 As a piece of evidence the letter nevertheless remained unverifiable, especially as it was postmarked Nottingham. 77 Drawing on two handbills posted near the lockup in Caldewgate after the arrest of Montgomery in December 1830, Hobsbawm and Rude´assumed that radicals instigated the Carlisle riots. One handbill sardonically offered: '£1,000 reward, in the apprehension of Borough-mongers, Stockjobbers, Tax-eaters, Monopolizers, Special Constables, and the Extinguishers of Freedom -by order of the SWING UNION'. 78 The other, addressed by 'Sargin Swen' to 'the compony', urged attendance at a meeting, 'for we are determined to release these three men that is [sic] in the [Caldew] gate'. 79 Though the second poster may have had connections with Cully's later effort to secure the prisoners' release, the origin of the first is unclear. Again, it is likely that the handbills were the work of radical individuals using the riots as a convenient opportunity to express their own political grievances. Such autonomous use of the Swing was demonstrated on 13 December at a meeting held by the Whig middle classes to discuss their petition for parliamentary reform. A deputation of weavers was invited to attend by the committee, but according to the Carlisle Journal one of them declared:
The burnings throughout the country have had a great effect in opening the eyes of the landowners. It is the notorious Captain Swing who has made so many Reformers. 80 By a fortnight after the riots, 'Swing' had become a powerful threat and a useful metonym to give the impression of strength and a wider reach for individuals or small groups who in fact had little connection to arson outbreaks in their district let alone further afield.
Finally, most letters threatened to burn threshing machines, the harvest machinery that constituted the apparent vanguard of agricultural 'improvement' and capitalist endeavour. This focus was out of line with the predominant feature of disturbances in the north (and indeed in the southern counties), the firing of stacks. Only a few threshing machines were known to have been attacked in Yorkshire, and none in Cumberland, during this period. 81 The first letter in the Carlisle collection, dated 2 December, warned Mr Studholme, a surveyor, against retaining 'the Corn thrashing machine' that he had erected on his premises. 82 In early December 1830 the Mayor of Doncaster received a letter signed 'Swing' that ordered him as an intermediary to 'put down all threshing machines instantly'. A similar letter received by a farmer at Rigton, near Leeds, read:
Sir, take notice that we send you word that your threshing mashine shal be burnt too ashishes before the month end and if you y it all Rigton wee will Burn it Dawn and Burn its too and so no more at present from me Mr Swing. 83 These scraps of paper prove little apart from signalling that the myth of Swing had taken hold and was useful for individuals with disparate motives, whose only connection with the rioting was a sense of common grievance against the local authorities. There is little other evidence that Swing was intended to be a co-ordinated campaign against the agricultural revolution.
Most of the suggestions that the riots were connected to the general idea of Swing, if not directly to the disturbances in the south, came from the prosecution witnesses at the assize trial. But the testimonies of these deponents are suspect because they were either involved with the agents provocateurs or were marked out by the crowd as targets. The evidence against James Cully, for example, who fled under warrant after allegedly calling out 'Jack Swing' during the riot, came from the informant William Huntington, and therefore cannot be verified. 84 Christopher Johnson Spencer, an upholsterer, stated that he heard a man in the crowd cry, 'It is the Swing System and it is to burn'. When Spencer attempted to help put out the fire, he was resisted with a shout of 'Down with the ''-'' Upholsterer'. 85 It is unclear whether the rioters believed they were taking part in a specifically 'Swing' attack or, whether it was in fact the authorities and the attacked who made the easy but fearful assumption that the incident was connected to the southern disturbances.
The mythical Swing of the letters was a metonym that, as Peter Jones has suggested, originated from the winding bye-lanes of rural Kent, but was quickly stretched and spread by 'the imaginations of newspaper correspondents and leader writers', before filtering into the suspicions of magistrates and landowners and 'back into the countryside again'. 86 Newspapers played a significant role in fostering the myth of Swing and perpetuating rumours in the North. Earlier in the century editors were pressed by governments not to report arson for fear of encouraging imitative attacks; it is also likely that newspapers did not report minor fires in rural areas beyond their reach. But by the early 1830s, certain newspapers fed upon and fostered popular interest in Swing. 87 The Whig-leaning Carlisle Journal was relatively neutral in its reporting but the Tory Carlisle Patriot, patronized by the Lowthers, was inflammatory. On 4 December the Patriot detailed the Swing attacks in the south, 'spreading with frightful rapidity over a large district of country', before describing the Carlisle arson as 'after the manner of Kent and the other southeastern counties of the kingdom'. The narrative of the events of 30 November, somewhat sensationally, was headed 'The Incendiary System in Carlisle', thereby conveying an impression of the Swing attacks as part of a coherent 'movement'. In this column, it reported gossip as well as facts, for example, a rumour 'in general circulation' at Carlisle and Dalston that 'the corn stacks of William Blamire Esq of Thackwendnook are to be fired some of these nights' because of suspicions that the magistrate 'had bought up a large quantity of corn and used his influence with the farmers to hold back their produce from the markets'.
88 Though unproven, this accusation perhaps reflected faith in an ideal of moral economy and community justice.
The sensationalism of the Tory press was mirrored by willingness -if not a desire -among the authorities to believe in the myth of Swing for their own purposes of defeating the unrest. A key feature of both phenomena, Luddism and Swing, was that the authorities as well as the protagonists in the unrest shared in the delusion of disparate groups being united under a mythical military leader. The idea of a 'movement' connected by threatening letters, trade unionists, or political radicals, and embodied in Captain Swing, was as much a product of the rumour-obsessed imaginations or cunning guile of its opponents as of the actions of the crowd or the patchy and unreliable evidence of the anonymous letters. 89 It is here that emotions came into play over and above objective considerations of structural forces. Fear, panic, rumour and hostility were all core responses that helped to engender solidarity within social and political groups and to foster opposition between them. 90 We should not presume that when magistrates and other local forces of order took up position against the fervour of the rioting crowd or the 'mysterious brotherliness' of the Irish immigrants they were entirely rational in their assessment of the situation. 91 The authorities believed in General Ludd and Captain Swing too, if only as a means of providing a convenient excuse for their inability to control the disturbances. 92 The press manipulated deeper emotional impulses among local communities, particularly the common fear of the stranger. The newspapers were eager to speculate about any unexplained cases of arson. In December 1830 at Barrow, near Barton-upon-Humber, though the local inhabitants assisted willingly in attempting to extinguish the blaze and though the owner Mr Westonby had 'received no threatening letter as had been reported', the Wakefield and Halifax Journal surmised that his stacks had been fired 'by a stranger' because 'he had a threshing machine on his premises'. 93 Similarly, in February 1832, a farmer from Fauld, near Longtown, eight miles north of Carlisle, suffered arson attacks on his stacks on two successive nights. The Carlisle Patriot noted that 'a suspicious looking person, supposed to be a man dressed in woman's clothes, was seen in the neighbourhood shortly before the fire was discovered'. 94 Magistrates and other officials reported the appearance of anonymous letters in tandem with general suspicions about 'strangers'. Such imaginings added extra layers to the myth of Swing. In December 1830, Edward Donedin, magistrate of Doncaster, reported to Earl Harewood that fourteen anonymous threatening letters directed at several prominent individuals had been 'found in the street' in the township of Crowle. Both Donedin and Harewood believed that there was a connection between the letters and the appearance of 'suspicious persons moving about in the neighbourhood seeking for work'. Harewood noted: 'it is stated to me that the arrival of Strangers has always proceeded [sic] acts of outrage'. In some cases, even the most respectable of the local notables were prone to panic. William Prest of Sherburn near Doncaster wrote to Harewood that he regarded his magisterial colleagues' action of swearing in 300 special constables because of a 'few foolish letters' as an exaggerated response to minor incidents of unrest. 95 Such suspicions suggest that at times of crisis local elites might dupe themselves into believing rumours propagated by the press, though respectable authorities would not have reported them for fear of losing credibility. The incendiary, working individually, anonymously and surreptitiously at night, was always likely to be mythologized as a stranger, outside the normal realms of local jurisdiction and observation. 96 This anxiety reflected the more general fears of magistrates and poor law officials about itinerant landless labourers, beggars, and vagrants. In the years preceding the 1834 New Poor Law, most Overseers of the Poor imagined vagrancy as a nightmare of anonymous and uncontrollable bands of migrant workers produced by industrialization and enclosure. Such concerns also echoed the fear of strangers common in folk tales and oral tradition, keenly fostered in areas where parish boundaries were still perambulated and common rights to land or work were determined by local custom. 97 The suspect stranger was a general bogey-man available for magistrates and employers who wanted to portray their own inhabitants as 'loyal'. This brings us back to the community outside the walls of Carlisle, where rumour and hostility to strangers combined to produce resistance. After the initial assault upon Benjamin Batty during his first entry into Caldewgate in 1827, the Carlisle Journal remarked that 'Old wives' reports flew about as usual, that they had proceeded to rebellion and in short for two hours business was at a stand and the town was in complete disarray'. 98 While the myth of Swing may have taken a few issues of the weekly local paper to foster, therefore, more immediate reactions could be evoked by word of mouth and the strength of 'old wives' tales'. * * * Peter Jones has argued that the mythic creation of Captain Swing was 'less a conscious act on the part of agricultural labourers than the result of a symbiotic relationship between labourers, cranks, crackpots, Radicals, leader writers, frightened farmers, correspondents, and finally the imagination of a public hard-wired in 1830 to find Frenchmen, Free Irishmen, and radical agitators hiding behind every haystack and lurking down every country lane'. 99 To this motley list can be added the authorities and local elites. The magistrates and Police Commission in Carlisle set up an incendiary attack in the mode of Swing in order to put down radicalism. But the riots of 30 November veered out of their control, beyond the stock narrative of Swing that they had determined would be enough to suppress the inhabitants of Caldewgate. Yet they, and their colleagues over in Yorkshire, continued to spread of the myth of Swing with less deliberate or even conscious intent and in a new direction. Feeding from the sensationalism of the Tory newspapers, they produced a scapegoat in order to account for their own weaknesses. They hoped for, if not imagined, the existence of Captain Swing in order to describe, conceptualize and comprehend their inability to deal with popular unrest within a rapidly changing society and economy. In less feverish times, they probably would have realized the absurdity of taking a 'few foolish letters' too seriously, but with mass incendiarism and machine-breaking in southern England reported every week in the northern press, they decided not to risk dismissing the isolated threats as harmless. Swing was not quite 'La Grande Peur' that had swept through revolutionary France, but it reflected a more general atmosphere of myth-making that took in millennarianism, a belief in a 'general rising', and imagined leaders in the early nineteenth century. 100 The background to the Carlisle riots in some ways parallels that of the southern Swing agitation: a long period of political disaffection, aggravated by economic depression and the extraordinary national and international events of 1830. The Swing rioters were not solely agricultural labourers: indeed, Roger Wells has pointed to 'journeymen artisans' leading role in some Swing theatres ' . 101 Yet there were important differences. In the North, incendiarism occurred close to expanding urban and industrial areas. In Carlisle, the tensions caused by that expansion created a framework for the disturbances. In the West Riding, the locations of suspected arson or anonymous letters in some cases echoed the old outlines of Luddite strongholds. 102 Swing did not spread in the same way as in the south: that is, disturbances did not spread from village to village, fostered by bands of marauding rioters or lone itinerants. Rather, newspapers played a prominent role in perpetuating both the idea of Captain Swing and a heightened atmosphere of fear. The agitation of the period 1830-2 would have just been a continuation of older forms of resistance and crime had it not been that the authorities (indeed more than the perpetrators) deployed Captain Swing as an eponym for what they believed to be a much larger conspiracy. The incidents in Cumberland and Yorkshire underline the significance of emotion and the imagination in both social movements and the actions of those who set out to suppress them. 103 Swing in the North was a product of rumour as much as of action, and of deliberate and unconscious mythmaking as much as of genuine grievance.
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